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Claude Lopez1 and Elham Saeidinezhad2 
 
A few months ago, we produced a timetable for the implementation of U.S. financial reform under the 
Dodd-Frank Act.3 One of the main observations was that the legislation did little to consolidate 
regulation outside of banking. In contrast, the analogous UK reform legislation, the Financial Services 
Act, made the Bank of England (BoE) the center of UK financial and monetary stability. A 2016 
amendment confirmed and strengthened the bank’s role. 
 
However, a significant number of UK financial rules are based on European Union regulations, and 
currently, as a member of the single market, the UK is subject to them. That membership also has given 
Britain a voice in EU rule making through representation in both the European Parliament and the 
Council of Ministers. The UK implements EU rules either by transposing EU directives into British law or 
by directly enforcing EU regulations. These differences are important, especially as Britain and the EU 
prepare for the approaching Brexit: To maintain the current regulatory framework, the UK will have to 
transpose all the EU regulations into its national law. This is even more important now with the EU’s 
increased usage of regulations as the final stage of the Basel III accord’s implementation approaches. 
Furthermore, the EU’s regulatory framework itself is a work in progress, with key deadlines in 2018 and 
2019. Forsaking EU membership will limit the UK’s ability to influence this process, although it may be 
obligated to follow the rules that result, because they are mostly driven by international regulatory 
efforts that include non-EU countries such as the U.S.  
 
Before assessing these challenges, this paper establishes a timeline summarizing the status of financial 
regulatory reform in the UK. It then identifies some of the forthcoming difficulties, including Brexit and 
the recent evolution of macroprudential policies among developed countries. 
 
Milestone Timeline 
In response to the global financial and European sovereign debt crises, as well as the Libor scandal, the 
UK fundamentally reformed its regulation of financial services. This new framework, presented in the 
Financial Services Act 2012, makes the Bank of England responsible for financial stability and places a 
strong emphasis on macroprudential policy. Monitoring systemically important institutions, markets, 
and activities is at the core of the act, the UK implementation of the Basel III accord.4 The act focuses on 
four main issues: strengthening financial stability via enhanced prudential rules; identifying and 
                                                           
1 Claude Lopez, PhD, leads the International Finance and Macroeconomics research team at the Milken Institute, 
clopez@milkeninstitute.org 
2 Elham Saeidinezhad, PhD, is a research economist on the team. 
3 Lopez and Saeidinezhad (2016). 
4 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/Pages/default.aspx. 
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monitoring systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and providing orderly resolution when 
necessary; increasing consumer protection and promoting competition; and enhancing the integrity of 
markets, including derivatives dealing and pension fund activities.  
 
Table 1, on page 10, shows the goals and implementation dates of the main regulatory changes in the 
UK We discuss these changes chronologically below. 
 
2012  
As noted, 2012 was a turning point for the UK regulatory architecture. The Financial Services Act 
completed the regulatory structural reform by abolishing the UK Financial Service Authority and creating 
three new financial regulators: the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA), and the Financial Policy Committee (FPC). As shown in Figure 1, the BoE houses the PRA 
and the FPC. The new regulators’ mission is to identify, prevent, and, if necessary, respond quickly to 
financial stability issues. 
 
Figure 1. Regulatory Architecture of UK 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013  
Under the authority of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act, the government implements several 
new banking regulations, many driven by Basel III. As a result, the BoE/PRA uses size, 
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interconnectedness, complexity, and business type as criteria to sort all national deposit-takers, 
investment firms, and insurers into five categories reflecting their potential impact on the financial 
system. Regulatory stringency is based on the degree of risk posed by each category, with the first 
category consisting of institutions whose failure would significantly disrupt the UK financial system.5 The 
concept of “ring fencing” is introduced this year. Large deposit-takers should ring-fence, or insulate, 
their investment banking activities from their retail operations. In contrast with the Volcker Rule in the 
U.S., the UK approach does not require ring-fenced bodies to be a separate legal entity from the group 
that engages in excluded activities. Instead, they must be sufficiently independent of this group. 
However, it is only in 2016 that the BoE/FPC provide some guidance regarding ring fencing’s 
implementation, with 2019 being the target implementation date. 
 
Furthermore, key EU directives and regulations start being transposed, or converted into British law, and 
implemented to improve market integrity and security dealing. These include the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR), which regulates the derivatives market, in particular OTC derivatives, 
central counterparties (CCPs), and trade repositories; the Alternative Investment Fund Managers 
Directive (AIFMD), which regulates hedge funds, private equity, and real estate funds; and the Financial 
Conglomerates Directive, which focuses on large financial groups active in different financial sectors, 
often across borders, and promotes convergence in national supervisory approaches and between 
sectors. The BoE, in charge of the supervision of financial market infrastructure (FMI), relies on directly 
applicable EU regulations, accompanied by binding technical standards for the supervision of CCP and 
securities settlement systems.6  
 
Finally, two other notable reforms focus on consumer protection. The Mortgage Market Rule gives the 
FCA power to regulate mortgage activity and to act upon poor practices where they emerge; the 
Temporary Product Intervention Rule empowers the FCA to intervene temporarily in the financial 
market if consumer protection is needed urgently, without seeking public comment.  
 
2014 
In 2014, the BoE/FPC implements the second phase of the SIFIs framework and publishes the first result 
of stress testing for the UK banking system.7  
 
Furthermore, financial governance within the EU is strengthened and harmonized by the creation of a 
“single rulebook,” which applies to the financial sector across the entire European Union, with the aim 
of enhancing financial market transparency and integrity. The provisions of the single rulebook are set 
out in three main legislative acts: 
 
                                                           
5 The BoE/PRA prudentially supervise banks, insurers and systemically important investment firms. The FCA is prudentially 
supervisor of all other financial firms. 
6 These UK and EU regulations and standards in turn follow global standards drawn up by central banks and securities market 
regulators working together through the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
7 The Committee of European Banking Supervisors ran EU-wide stress tests in 2009 and 2010. Starting in 2011, the European 
Banking Authority has been running EU-wide stress tests every two years. 
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 Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive (CRD IV), which implements the Basel III capital 
requirements for banks. The CRD must be implemented through national law, whereas the 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) is directly applicable to firms across the EU.8  
 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), which establishes a harmonized framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms found to be in danger of 
failing.  
 Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive (DGSD), which regulates deposit insurance in case of a 
bank’s inability to meet its liabilities.  
 
CRD IV was implemented in the UK in 2014 and DGSD and BRRD were implemented in 2015. 
The Financial Stability Information Power also enables the BoE/PRA “to require a person to provide 
information or documents relevant to the stability of one or more aspects of the UK financial system."9  
At the same time, the FCA expanded its supervisory authority to all firms, financial or nonfinancial, that 
provide consumer credit. It also pushes legislation, such as the Client Assets Regime for Investment 
Business (CASS), to improve competition and regulatory transparency while protecting investors.10 
 
2015 
In 2015, the BoE/PRA and FCA publish their final rules regarding the last step of the SIFIs framework: 
recovery and resolution planning. The SIFIs supervision is extended to the insurance industry at the 
European level, with the implementation of the Solvency II Directive scheduled for 2016. In anticipation, 
the BoE/PRA performs the first general insurance stress testing.11 
 
Several major EU rules, mostly related to conduct in an effort to increase transparency and investor and 
consumer protection, are transposed into UK law. These include the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive II (MiFID), which, with the accompanying Regulation Markets in Financial Instruments 
Regulation (MiFIR) and technical standards—collectively MiFID II—build on and extend the scope of 
MiFID I that created a single market for investment services and activities.12 However, its 
implementation date is later delayed to 2018. 
 
 
2016 
                                                           
8 Most capital requirement aspects of CRD IV, such as minimum capital requirements and capital buffer requirements, have 
already become binding legislation. Liquidity requirements, i.e., the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding 
ratio (NSFR), are still a work in progress, with full implementation planned by 2018. Leverage ratios are expected to be reported 
by the end of 2016, with legislation to make it a binding measure—if necessary—as of 2018. 
9 Prudential Regulation Authority (2014, p. 3). 
10 The UK Treasury transferred credit consumer regulatory authority to the FCA. While most of the rules took effect in 2014, the 
transitional period for certain prudential requirements on debt management ends in 2017. 
11 The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) started its first sets of EU-wide stress tests in 2011. It 
grew to be part of the implementation of Solvency II, in 2015, and included 50% of insurance companies per country. Starting in 
2015, PRA conducts a general insurance stress test exercise for all Category 1 and 2 UK-regulated general insurers as part of the 
act. Additional, major UK insurers go through EU-wide EIOPA stress tests. 
12 https://www.esma.europa.eu/policy-rules/mifid-ii-and-mifir. 
13 UCITS V also harmonizes the administrative regimes for mutual funds across the EU. 
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Many of the 2016 changes focus on improving market integrity and increasing consumer and investor 
protection. The implementation of pension reforms forces significant changes in the pensions and 
retirement income market. The reforms reflect the FCA’s goal of ensuring that consumers have access to 
products and services that are well governed and deliver value within open, competitive, and innovative 
markets. The reforms require firms to make significant operational and technical changes. This period of 
change will continue in 2017 with the introduction of a secondary annuity market.  
 
Other changes such as the Senior Managers Regime, Senior Insurance Managers Regime, and 
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities Directive (UCITS V) focus on 
strengthening personal accountability for the management of designated firms.13 The Bank of England 
and Financial Services Act expands the notion of enhanced accountability to all firms. This last piece of 
legislation confirms and reinforces the central place of the Bank of England in terms of monetary and 
financial stability. 
 
The Road Ahead 
Nearly a decade after the global financial crisis, the implementation of UK financial reform remains a 
work in progress. Furthermore, recent international developments, from Brexit to the potential of 
diverging macroprudential and monetary policy among leading economies, such as the U.S. and Europe, 
threaten to weaken resolve to implement worldwide coordinated financial policy. 
 
As noted above, implementation dates are approaching for many of the regulations. For banking reform, 
the last step of the SIFIs approach, recovery and resolution, requires the BoE to establish the Minimum 
Requirement for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities (MREL) regime to ensure that firms have sufficient 
capacity to absorb losses, so that their failure would not disrupt the larger economy. In November 2016, 
the BoE set MREL’s technical standards and extended full implementation to 2022, with the exception of 
“global systemically important banks,” which must meet the FSB’s total loss-absorbing capacity by 2019. 
Implementation of the ring-fencing rule also is planned for 2019.  
 
Similarly, for the nonbanking sector, major reforms either have a forthcoming implementation date or 
are still at a negotiation/design stage. The European money market fund reform has yet to become law, 
while significant reforms to stabilize activities in the capital markets, such as EMIR and MiFID II, are a 
work in progress; although EMIR has already come into force, technical requirements that are key to its 
implementation aren’t complete. Furthermore, the implementation date for MiFID II has been delayed 
until January 2018. These two regulations, combined with the Central Securities Depositories Regulation 
(CSDR), are the three pillars of a framework to regulate systemically important securities infrastructures. 
CSDR came into force in 2014; however, many of the requirements will not apply until technical 
standards become UK law. Finally, while central counterparties (CCPs) are the form of financial market 
infrastructure (FMI) that have attracted the most attention from regulators, securities settlement 
systems are key to reducing credit and liquidity risk, especially during market distress, and very little has 
been done to address the problem.14  
                                                           
13 UCITS V also harmonizes the administrative regimes for mutual funds across the EU. 
14 The system helps ensure that payments accompany deliveries of securities. It thereby reduces liquidity risk and credit risk by 
decreasing the chance that deliveries or payments would be withheld during periods of financial stress. 
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The timing of these implementations coincides with the timeline for Brexit. As noted above, the UK 
regulatory system relies heavily on EU rules that, as an EU member, the UK helped design. Beyond 
removing the UK’s voice and expertise in influencing future policies, Brexit will have a direct impact on 
existing processes. These include “passporting” and clearing euro-denominated derivatives. Changes to 
either could cause significant disruption for both the UK and EU.  
 
Passporting: This refers to the ability of any financial firm registered in one of 28 EU states, plus Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway, to operate throughout the entire region without any additional 
authorization. Furthermore, it makes the process more efficient thanks to features such as home state 
supervision, which reduces regulatory burdens. It also allows exemptions from local regulatory deposit 
requirements, which decrease costs by enabling British firms to run relatively large international 
businesses as branches rather than as separately capitalized subsidiaries. Passporting is essential to 
some of the current regulations such as MiFID and CRD IV. Its demise would have a significant impact, 
especially for banking, since about a fifth of the UK banking sector’s annual revenue depends on it.15 As 
currently defined, passporting rights are linked directly to EU single-market membership, again with the 
exceptions of Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. 
 
Euro-denominated derivatives clearing: About 75 percent of European trading in euro-denominated 
interest-rate swaps, a major type of derivative, takes place in the UK, compared with 13 percent in 
France and 2 percent in Germany.16  In 2015, the European Court of Justice strengthened London’s role 
in derivatives clearing by ruling against the European Central Bank (ECB) requirement for CCPs involved 
in securities clearing to be within the euro zone. The court specified that “the ECB does not have the 
competence necessary to impose such a requirement” and that location was not a requirement of the 
Treaty on Functioning of the European Union.17 Besides the expertise of clearinghouses such as LCH, a 
key component for this ruling was the UK’s membership in the EU.  
 
Finally, the success of financial regulation in mitigating systemic risk ultimately relies on international 
coordination. Such coordination, and subordination of national specificities, came easily amid the 
urgency of the financial crisis and its immediate aftermath. Since then, differing rates of recovery and 
the expectation of diverging monetary policies have refocused regulators’ attention on their countries’ 
individual needs.  
 
Divergence in macroprudential policy and international coordination: The erosion of international policy 
coordination is particularly notable in banking. In the days following the Brexit vote, the BoE/FPC 
announced the loosening of some of the newest macroprudential requirements in order to strengthen 
the resilience of UK banks in anticipation of heightened economic uncertainty.18 In September, the 
                                                           
15 Scarpetta and Booth (2016) estimate that around a fifth of the UK banking sector’s annual revenue depends on passporting, 
compared with around 11% of the insurance market gross written premium and 7% of the asset managed in the UK They also 
discuss the limitation of existing alternatives to passporting, such as equivalence and negotiating bespoke deals and local 
arrangements. 
16 Bank for International Settlements statistics (April 2016). 
17 General Court of the European Union (2015).  
18 FPC loosened its macroprudential standards by excluding central bank reserves from the exposure measure in the current UK 
leverage ratio framework. It also reduced the UK countercyclical capital buffer rate for the largest banks and allowed insurance 
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European Commission hinted that it might not accept the final stage of Basel III reforms, saying, “[We] 
need an intelligent solution which takes account of the individual banks’ situations and maintains a risk-
sensitive approach to setting capital requirements. Different banks have different business models 
which involve different levels of risk.” 19 At the same time, the U.S. Federal Reserve is supportive of more 
stringent measures in the last stage.20  
 
Difficult negotiations between the EU and the U.S. are not new. Reaching an agreement to accept one 
another’s derivatives rules took three years, a lengthy negotiation considering that a lack of 
convergence would have been quite disruptive to the derivatives market. Yet, when it comes to banking 
regulation, the differences may be even more deeply ingrained in regional specificities. The EU and the 
UK rely heavily on banks. More than 90 percent of corporate debt in Europe consists of bank loans, with 
less than 10 percent coming from the corporate bond markets. Lending in the U.S. is more balanced.21 
Furthermore, large European banks historically have been global leaders in cross-border lending. As a 
result, their business model, which often includes a relatively strong international exposure, may appear 
less threatening to European regulators than to their U.S. counterparts. The European commissioner in 
charge of the Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, in line with many 
European regulators, has recently emphasized a conceptual difference in the context of finalizing Basel 
III: “It is perfectly normal for a bank focused on lending in a sector and region with low risks to have 
lower average risk weights than a bank operating elsewhere.” 
 
When it comes to financial regulations, it matters very little whether the UK is part of the EU, as the new 
regulatory framework is an international initiative. Basel III and its attempt to standardize information 
sharing and assessment methods enabled more rigorous monitoring of the banking sector. Ultimately, 
the Basel reforms should also avoid divergence of requirements and minimize the compliance burden 
across jurisdictions, geographic or otherwise (domestic SIFIs versus global SIFIs).  
 
However, this harmonized regulatory framework applies to countries that have different economic 
performances, monetary policy, and financial markets. As a result, while it makes monitoring more 
efficient, it does not imply that the appropriate policy response should be the same across countries. In 
other words, different business models between large U.S. and European banks or between industries, 
such as asset managers and banks, require different policy choices, even in terms of macroprudential 
policy. 
  
                                                           
companies some flexibility in Solvency II regulations when recalculating transitional measures. See records of FPC meetings for 
June 25, July 12 and September 20. 
19 Dombrovskis (2016). 
20 Tarullo (2016). 
21 Based on BIS data, the composition of EU, UK and U.S. bank loan (debt issuance) can be approximate; 90 (10), 71 (29) and 56 
(44) percent, respectively, Wright (2015). 
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Table 1. Goals and implementations22  
Financial stability Targeted outcome  Target Implementation  
Financial Services Act  Implement a new regulatory 
framework 
Financial system and 
financial services 
2012, 2013, and 2017 
Prudential rules, such as 
Requirements Directive IV 
(CRD IV)  
Implementation of Basel III’s 
prudential regulation 
Banks, building 
societies, and 
investment firms23 
January 2014, with full 
implementation in 
January 2019 
Solvency II Directive Harmonize EU insurance 
regulation 
Insurers Implemented in January 
2016 
Standards for financial 
market infrastructure 
Harmonize with international 
standards 
Recognized payment 
system, securities 
settlement systems, 
and recognized 
clearinghouse (RCH) 
April 2013, with full 
implementation by 
2018-19 
Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme Directive (DGSD) 
Prevent depositors from 
making panic withdrawals from 
banks 
Banks, building 
societies, and credit 
union 
July 2015 
Central Securities 
Depositories Regulation 
(CSDR) 
 
 
 
 
 
Harmonize the authorization 
and supervision of EU CSDs and 
certain settlement aspects, 
such as timing and conduct of 
securities settlement 
An institution that 
holds financial 
instruments, including 
equities, bonds, money 
market instruments, 
and mutual funds 
September 2014, with 
full implementation by 
2017 
 
 
 
 
Financial stability 
information 
power 
Improving financial stability by 
requiring firms to provide 
information or documents that 
the PRA considers are, or might 
be, relevant to the stability of 
one or more aspects of the UK 
financial system. 
PRA regulated firms  June 2014 
SIFIs Targeted outcome  Target Implementation  
Designation/categorization Identify the different degree of 
risk an institution can generate 
for the financial system 
Banks, building 
societies, credit unions, 
insurers, and major 
investment firms 
April 201324 
                                                           
22 As of October 2016. 
23 A building society is a financial institution owned by its members as a mutual organization. It offers banking and related 
financial services, especially savings and mortgage lending (source: Wikipedia). 
24 The first set of categorization occurred in April 2013 and designation occurred in December 2013. 
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Stress testing (UK & EU-
wide stress test)  
Assess the system’s capital 
adequacy in order to enhance 
its resilience under stress 
Banks, insurance 
companies, investment 
firms, and CCPs 
At the European level, 
bank stress testing 
started in 2011, 
insurance in 2016, CCPs 
in 2016.25 BoE via PRA 
started bank stress 
testing in 2014; for 
insurance, in 2016 
 
Bank and Investment Firm 
Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) 
Plan to orderly manage the 
failure of a firm  
All financial institutions 
within the scope of the 
resolution regime26 
To be implemented by 
2018. However BoE on 
November 2016 set the 
Minimum Requirement 
for own funds and 
Eligible Liabilities (MREL) 
to be implemented by 
202227. 
Consumer/investor 
protection 
Targeted outcome  Target Implementation  
Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II 
(MiFID II) and the 
Markets in Financial 
Instruments Regulation 
(MiFIR) 
Improve the competitiveness of 
EU financial markets by creating 
a single market for investment 
services and activities and by 
harmonizing protection for 
investors in financial 
instruments 
Investment services 
and trading venues 
MiFIR: July 2014, but 
technical standards need 
to be approved; MiFID II: 
by 2018 
Client assets protection 
regime (CASS) 
 
Protect customers’ money and 
assets as fundamental to 
consumers’ rights 
Banks, brokers, asset 
managers, investment 
firms 
June 2014 
Pension reform  Secure an appropriate degree of 
protection for consumers, 
promote effective competition 
in the interest of consumers  
Every individual or firm 
providing pensions and 
retirement services or 
information and 
consumer 
representative bodies 
 
April 2016  
                                                           
25 By EBA, EIOPA, and ESMA, respectively. 
26 The bank has the responsibility for the resolution of a failing bank, building society, or investment firm and its group 
companies. CCPs are also seeking a resolution plan through the 2012 CPMI-IOSCO Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure, 
as implemented within the EU by EMIR. 
27 MREL is a requirement under the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. The new rules will be introduced in 
two phases. Banks will be obliged to comply with interim requirements by 2020. From 1 January 2022, the largest 
UK banks will hold sufficient resources to allow the Bank of England to resolve them in an orderly way. 
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Mortgage Market Rule Allow regulators to deal with 
firms that adopt high-risk 
strategies and intervene where 
business models and strategies 
create undue risks for firms, 
consumers, and the financial 
system generally 
Mortgage lenders and 
administrators 
April 2014 
Temporary Product 
Intervention Rule 
Protect consumers in the short 
term while allowing either the 
FCA or industry to develop a 
more permanent solution 
FCA’s authorized firms April 2013 
 
 
 
 
Market integrity and 
derivatives dealing 
Targeted outcome Target Implementation 
Ring fencing Separate certain retail 
banking activities into 
separate entities within 
the corporate group. 
These ring-fenced bodies 
are then prohibited from 
carrying out certain 
activities, including 
dealing in investments as 
principal 
Institutions that have 
more than £25 billion of 
“core deposit”—broadly, 
those from individuals and 
small businesses—on 
average, over a period of 
three years 
January 2019 
European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation 
on derivatives, central 
counterparties, and trade 
repositories (EMIR) 
Reduce counterparty risk 
that can become systemic, 
implementing new risk 
management standards, 
including reporting 
requirement, and 
operational processes, for 
all bilateral over-the-
counter derivatives 
OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties, and trade 
repositories 
April 2014, with full 
implementation by 2019 
Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers Directive 
(AIFMD) 
Increase transparency by 
AIFMs and data sharing 
with relevant regulators to 
efficiently monitor 
financial systems in the 
EU; also is intended to 
protect investors 
Hedge funds and private 
equity 
June 2013, with full 
implementation by 2018 
Senior Managers Regime 
(SMR) and Senior 
Insurance Managers 
Regime (SIMR) 
Ensure personal 
accountability of senior 
management in case of 
professional misconducts 
Banks, building societies, 
credit unions, and PRA-
designated investment 
firms and insurance 
companies 
March 2016, to be applied 
to “all” registered financial 
firms by 2018 
Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in 
Transferable Securities 
Directive (UCITS V) 
Strengthen the level of 
protection for investors in 
UCITS and harmonize the 
level of supervision by EU 
regulators 
Mutual funds and 
alternative investment 
funds 
March 2016 
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